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Abstract 
Empirical research on the bodily self has only recently started to investigate how the link 
between a body and the experience of this body as mine is developed, maintained or disturbed. 
The Rubber Hand Illusion has been used as a model instance of the normal sense of embodiment 
to investigate the processes that underpin the experience of body-ownership. This review puts 
forward a neurocognitive model according to which body-ownership arises as an interaction 
between current multisensory input and internal models of the body. First, a pre-existing stored 
model of the body distinguishes between objects that may or many not be part of one’s body. 
Second, on-line anatomical and postural representations of the body modulate the integration of 
multisensory information that leads to the recalibration of visual and tactile coordinate systems. 
Third, the resulting referral of tactile sensation will give rise to the subjective experience of 
body-ownership. These processes involve a neural network comprised of the right 
temporoparietal junction which tests the incorporeability of the external object, the secondary 
somatosensory cortex which maintains an online representation of the body, the posterior parietal 
and ventral premotor cortices which code for the recalibration of the hand-centred coordinate 
systems, and the right posterior insula which underpins the subjective experience of body-
ownership. The experience of body-ownership may represent a critical component of self-
specificity as evidenced by the different ways in which multisensory integration in interaction 
with internal models of the body can actually manipulate important physical and psychological 
aspects of the self. 
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1. Experimenting with body-ownership 
At the inaugural lecture of the Centre for Subjectivity Research (Copenhagen, Denmark), 
Waldenfels referred to the riddle of “how to justify the fact that a certain physical body is called 
my own body (corpus meum) and how to find out whether there are other bodies that are 
animated by other minds” (Waldenfels, 2004, p.235). In essence, the riddle mentioned by 
Waldenfels refers to the foundations of the experience of one’s own body:  “What grounds my 
experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it 
does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own” (de Vignemont, 2007, p. 427). 
Empirical research on the bodily self has only recently started to investigate how the link 
between a body and the experience of this body as mine is developed, maintained or disturbed.  
Motor cognition operationalizes the self as a physical entity underpinned by the 
processing of multisensory and motor signals that generate the experiences of ownership over 
her body and agency over her actions. Recent approaches stemming out from this emphasis on 
sensorimotor processing and its relevance for higher cognition have attempted to explain these 
two basic senses of one’s body: the sense of agency and the sense of body-ownership. The two 
senses of body-ownership and agency jointly constitute a minimal, bodily, sense of self, but their 
exact relation remains unknown. It is not in the purpose of this review to discuss the interactions 
between body-ownership and agency (for a discussion see Synfozik, Vosgerau & Neuen, 2008; 
Tsakiris, Schutz-Bosbach & Gallagher, 2007). Instead, the focus will be on the sense of body-
ownership per se. Body-ownership refers to the special perceptual status of one’s own body, 
which makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself, that is, the feeling that ‘‘my body’’ 
belongs to me, and is ever present in my mental life (Gallagher 2000).  
William James noted that contrary to the perception of an object, which can be perceived 
from different perspectives or even cease to be perceived, we experience “the feeling of the same 
old body always there” (James, 1890/1981, p. 242). Echoing James, Merleau-Ponty (1962) wrote 
that “[…] the permanence of my own body is entirely different in kind … Its permanence is not a 
permanence in the world, but a permanence on my part” (p. 90). This seemingly inescapable 
permanence of the body raises interesting methodological problems in our attempt to study body-
ownership scientifically. Classical experimental designs in psychology involve the direct 
comparison between conditions where the phenomenon under investigation is either present or 
absent. The experimental isolation of body-ownership by direct manipulations that make the 
body present in one experimental condition but absent in another would seem problematic, if not 
impossible. Early studies on the bodily self focused mainly on self-recognition in human and 
non-human primates. Jeannerod and colleagues performed a series of experiments on self-
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recognition of bodily movements (for a review see Jeannerod, 2003). In most studies of self-
recognition, participants see a body-part , which may or may not be related to their own body, 
and judge whether it is their own body-part or not. The information available to support this 
judgment is systematically varied across conditions, for example by moving the hand (Daprati et 
al., 1997; Sirigu et al., 1999; Tsakiris et al., 2005), by introducing delays between the movement 
and the visual feedback (Franck et al, 2001), or by rotating the hand image (Van den Bos & 
Jeannerod, 2002). Self-recognition requires the monitoring and integration of various sources of 
information such as intention, efferent and afferent signals in a short time-window. The tasks 
require an explicit self-recognition judgment: the participant’s body-part is objectified, that is, a 
body-part is presented like an external object projected on a screen, and the experimental 
manipulations  focus on the conditions under which this body-part will be judged as mine. 
Therefore, these experiments involve explicit judgments of agency (e.g. “was that your action?”) 
and body-ownership (e.g. “was that your hand?”), rather than the feeling of agency and body-
ownership per se (see also Synofzik, Vosgerau & Neuen, 2008).  Experimentation with the 
feeling of body-ownership becomes possible when one uses multisensory stimulation as a means 
of altering the experience of the body: the experience of body-ownership being present in one 
condition, and absent in another.  
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) emerged as an experimental paradigm that allows the 
controlled manipulation of the experience of body-ownership. In brief, watching a rubber hand 
being stroked synchronously with one’s own unseen hand causes the rubber hand to be attributed 
to one’s own body, to “feel like it’s my hand” (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). This illusion does not 
occur when the rubber hand is stroked asynchronously with respect to the subject’s own hand. 
One behavioural correlate of the RHI is an induced change in the perceived location of the 
participant’s own hand towards the rubber hand. Botvinick and Cohen (1998) showed that, after 
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation of the rubber hand and the participant’s hand, participants 
perceived the position of their hand to be closer to the rubber hand than it really was. Similar 
patterns of misolocalizations and proprioceptive drifts have been obtained with different 
response methods (see Tsakiris, 2007 for a review, and Kammers et al. 2008 for a dissociation 
between different response types). Interestingly, the prevalence of illusion over time (Botvinick 
& Cohen, 1998) and the subjective intensity of the experience of body-ownership (Longo et al, 
2008) are positively correlated with changes in the felt location of the subject’s own hand 
towards the rubber hand. The successful manipulation of body-ownership during the RHI has 
been demonstrated in several replications (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
Longo et al., 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007) and modifications of the 
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classic paradigm (Austen et al., 2004; Capelari et al., 2009; Durgin et al, 2007; Ehrsson, 2007; 
Ehrsson et al, 2007,2008; Hägni et al., 2008; Kammers et al., 2009; Kanayama, Sato & Ohira, 
2007, 2008; Lenggenhager et al, 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2006, 
2009; Slater et al., 2008; Tsakiris, Prabhu & Haggard, 2006) since the original study (Botvinick 
& Cohen, 1998). 
The RHI paradigm is one of the few viable ways of investigating body-ownership 
scientifically because it allows for an external object to be treated, rather than simply recognized, 
as part of my body.  The present review will argue that the experimental paradigm of the RHI 
can inform a viable model of the normal experience of body-ownership in general, in contrast to 
self-recognition and tool-use paradigms that tackle different cognitive processe, such as body-
recognition and body-extension respectively. The following sections will review the 
phenomenology of body-ownership (see section 2), the roles of multisensory integration and of 
cognitive (i.e. non-primarily sensory) body representations for body-ownership (see sections 3 
and 4). Sections 5 and 6 present a neurocognitive model of body-ownership in terms of 
information processing (section 5) and its neural substrates (section 6). The review concludes 
with recent extensions of the body-ownership studies to full bodies and self-identity. 
 
2. What is the experience of body-ownership like? 
A large sample study (Longo et al., 2008) investigated the subjective experience during 
the RHI by asking participants to complete a 27-item questionnaire after each of the synchronous 
and asynchronous blocks of visuo-tactile stimulation. A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
revealed that the subjective experience of ownership of the rubber hand consists of distinct 
dissociable components present in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions (Longo et al., 
2008) : ownership (e.g rubber hand as part of one’s body);  location (i.e. the rubber hand and 
one’s own hand were in the same place, also to sensations of causation between the seen and felt 
touches); and  agency (i.e. being able to move the rubber hand and control over it). A further 
analysis focused on the relation between the component scores and the behavioural proxy of the 
RHI used in this study (i.e. proprioceptive drift obtained with the method described in Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005). Embodiment of rubber hand in general significantly predicted the 
proprioceptive displacement.  
A follow-up study (Longo et al, 2009) used the same sample to investigate the extent to 
which the experience of ownership over the rubber hand may impact on the perceived similarity 
between the participant’s own hand and the rubber hand. Objective similarity with regards to 
skin luminance, hand shape, and third-person similarity ratings did not appear to influence 
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participants’ experience of the RHI. Conversely, the experience of ownership of the rubber hand 
altered the physical similarity that participants perceived between their own hand and the rubber 
hand. Participants who experienced the RHI perceived their hand and the rubber hand as 
significantly more similar, than participants who did not experience the illusion, suggesting that 
ownership leads to perceived similarity, but perceived similarity does not lead to ownership.  
These studies, among the first to provide an in-depth and quantified analysis of the 
subjective experience during the RHI, demonstrate that the model instance of embodiment 
during the RHI induces a complex yet structured experience of body-ownership with identifiable 
components. Overall, it seems that three main aspects of embodiment are successfully 
manipulated during RHI: the sense of ownership of the rubber hand, the perceived location of the 
participant’s own hand, and the perceived similarity of appearance of body-parts. A fourth, and 
perhaps the most intriguing, component that could be involved in RHI is a change in the 
experience of one’s own body during this illusion of body-ownership. Will the experienced 
ownership over a new body-part subsequently alter the experience of my body? One possibility 
is that the rubber hand is simply added as a third supernumerary limb to one’s body, without 
actually affecting the experience of one’s own hand. Alternatively, the rubber hand may replace 
the participant’s own hand, and in turn, alter the experience of one’s hand. Consistent 
introspective and behavioural measures suggest that the rubber hand is not simply added as a 
third limb, but instead replaces the real hand, both in terms of phenomenal experience and 
physiological regulation. Participants denied that they felt as is they had three hands, while they 
accepted the statement that that they felt as if their own hand had disappeared, and that their own 
hand was in the location where the rubber hand was (Longo et al, 2008). Therefore, accounts of 
the subjective RHI experience suggest that incurred changes do not consist of an addition or 
extension of one’s body, but instead they cause incorporation and moreover replacement of one’s 
own hand.  
A recent study by Moseley et al. (2008) provides direct evidence that the experience of 
ownership during RHI is also accompanied by significant changes in the homeostatic regulation 
of the real hand, beyond changes in the subjective experience of one’s body. In particular, skin 
temperature of the real hand decreased when participants experienced the RHI. Additionally, the 
magnitude of the decrease in skin temperature on the participant’s own hand was positively 
correlated with the vividness of the illusion. Importantly, this effect was absent in the mere 
presence of synchronous visual and tactile stimulation (see Experiment 5 in Moseley et al, 2008), 
but occurred only as a result of the experience of ownership. Thus, experienced ownership over a 
new body-part has direct consequences for real body-parts that occur once participants 
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experience the RHI, and not simply as the direct result of multisensory integration. Therefore, 
cognitive processes that disrupt the awareness of our physical self may in turn disrupt the 
physiological regulation of the self  (Moseley et al, 2008). The changes caused in the 
physiological regulation of the self as a result of the experience of body-ownership over and 
above multisensory integration suggests that processes other than multisensory integration may 
be involved in generating, maintaining or disrupting the awareness of the bodily self.  
 
3. The bottom-up account of body-ownership: the role of intermodal matching 
Why and how is the rubber hand experienced as part of one’s body? In brief, the RHI 
reflects the malleability of the representation of the body caused by multisensory processing. 
Multisensory processing aims at the integration of sensory signals and the resolution of potential 
conflicts to generate a coherent representation of the world and the body on the basis of sensory 
stimulation. The RHI reflects a three-way weighted interaction between vision, touch, and 
proprioception: vision of tactile stimulation on the rubber hand captures the tactile sensation on 
the participant’s own hand, and this visual capture results in a mislocalization of the felt location 
of one’s own hand towards the spatial location of the visual percept. Botvinick and Cohen (1998) 
put forward a bottom-up explanation of the RHI by suggesting that intermodal matching between 
vision and touch is sufficient for self-attribution of the rubber hand. The first RHI studies showed 
the presence of synchronized visual and tactile stimulation to be a necessary condition for the 
inducement of the RHI, since RHI did not occur after asynchronous stimulation (Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). But does this make intermodal 
matching sufficient for the experience of body-ownership?  
 Armel and Ramachandran (2003) held a strong version of the Botvinick and Cohen view 
by arguing that visuo-tactile correlation is both necessary and sufficient condition for the RHI: 
any object can be experienced as part of one’s body if the appropriate intermodal matching is 
present. If after the synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation period, the experimenter “injured’ the 
rubber hand (e.g. the experimenter bent one of the rubber fingers backwards), Skin Conductance 
Responses (SCRs) measured from the subject’s unstimulated hand were significantly higher 
compared to the control asynchronous condition (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). Similar 
differences, albeit smaller in magnitude, between SCRs for synchronous and asynchronous 
conditions were found when participants observed a table, instead of a rubber hand, being 
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stroked while tactile stimulation was delivered on the participant’s own hand.1 According to 
Armel and Ramachandran (2003), both the rubber hand and the table, and in principle any other 
object, can be experienced as part of one’s body, provided that strong visuo-tactile correlations 
are present. Therefore, the illusion that “the fake hand/table is my hand”, and more general the 
sense of body-ownership, is the result of a bottom-up mechanism, which associates synchronous 
visuo-tactile events:  any object can become part of “me”, simply because strong statistical 
correlations between different sensory modalities are both necessary and sufficient conditions for 
body-ownership.  
Indeed, the possibility that body-ownership arises in a bottom-up fashion, as an 
accumulative effect of frequent and recurring multisensory correlations during ontogeny cannot 
be excluded. Developmental studies suggest that intermodal matching is a prerequisite for self-
identification (Rochat & Striano, 2000). At the same time, developmental studies also suggest 
that at least some body representations seem to be innate, facilitating intermodal matching. For 
example, Morgan and Rochat (1997) showed that 3 month old infants, with relatively little 
experience of seeing their legs, are sensitive to left-right reversal of their own legs shown on a 
screen and to differences in the relative movements and/or the featural characteristics of the legs 
(i.e., the relative bending of the legs at the knees and ankles), supporting the idea of innate 
representations of the anatomical and structural features of a normative body. The extent to 
which multisensory input is the sole drive of body-ownership or not is a controversial issue at the 
heart of the neurocognitive understanding of body-ownership in particular, and of body-
representations more generally (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997; de Vignemont, Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2006; Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; Graziano & Botvinick, 2001; Carruthers, 2008; Holmes & 
Spence, 2006; Sirigu et al., 1991; Tsakiris & Fotopoulou, 2008).  
An alternative or complimentary approach to this bottom-up view of body-ownership 
would consider the top-down role played by non-primarily sensory representations of the body in 
addition to the contribution of current multisensory input. It is still debated whether current 
multisensory experience is assimilated to a form of a reference anatomical and structural 
representations of the body, possibly arising from prior experience and also innate body-
representations that involve more than the mere registration of peripheral inputs, and in that 
sense, they can be called “cognitive”. As broadly defined by Graziano & Botvinick (2001), body 
                                                 
1 SCRs for the synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation when looking at a table were of the same 
magnitude as SCRs for the asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation when looking at a rubber hand 
(M=0.24,whereas mean SCR for the synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation when looking at a rubber 
hand was 0.34) . As Armel and Ramachadran (2003) note , the rubber hand condition was significantly 
more effective at inducing the illusion than the table when measured by intensity ratings (p<0.001),  
and marginally so for SCRs  (p=0.05). 
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representations involve the interpretation of peripheral inputs in the context of a rich internal 
model of the body's structure; body-related percepts are not simply correlated, but they are 
integrated against a set of background conditions that preserve the coherence of bodily 
experience. These background conditions would require different types of body-representations 
to modulate the integration of current multisensory input in a top-down manner. On this latter 
view, intermodal matching may not be sufficient for the experience of body-ownership.  
 
4. Top-down modulations : the evidence against the bottom-up account 
4.1.On corporal and non-corporeal objects. 
If body-ownership was driven by synchronous multisensory stimulation as a sufficient 
condition, then we would expect to induce a sense of body-ownership over objects that do not 
resemble body-parts. Accumulating evidence suggests that the RHI is not induced when the 
rubber hand is replaced by a neutral non-corporeal object such a wooden stick (i.e. coding of 
visual form representations of body-parts, Haans, Ijsselsteijn & de Kort, 2008; Tsakiris & 
Haggard 2005; Tsakiris, Costantini & Haggard 2008, see also Holmes, Snijders,  & Spence, 
2006; see also Graziano, Cooke and Taylor 2000, but cf. Armel and Ramachandran 2003). 
Instead the viewed object should match a visual representation of the tactually stimulated body-
part for the synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation to elicit a sense of body-ownership. Following 
on the work of Graziano et al (2000) on bimodal neurons in monkeys and Tsakiris & Haggard 
(2005) on RHI, Haans et al (2008) revisited the hypothesis that any object can be self-attributed 
if strong statistical correlations between vision and touch are present. Haans et al (2008) assessed 
the strength of the RHI in a factorial design where a viewed object that could have a hand shape 
or not, with a natural-skin texture or not, was stimulated in synchrony with the participant’s own 
hand. The results, contrary to what Armel & Ramachadran (2003) predicted, showed that a hand-
shaped object induced a stronger RHI as measured with a questionnaire than a non-hand-shaped 
object (see also Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., in press). In contrast, the main effect 
of texture was not significant, while the interaction of shape by texture was significant because 
natural skin texture increased the RHI strength for a hand-shaped object, but not for a non hand-
shaped object. These findings further support the hypothesis that no experience of ownership is 
induced when the viewed object does not resemble the human hand, even if the texture is hand-
like.  
4.2. Anatomical and Postural Constrains 
The experience of body-ownership during the RHI is abolished when the rubber hand is 
placed in an incongruent anatomical posture with respect to one’s own hand (i.e. coding of 
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postural representations of body-parts, see Costantini and Haggard 2007; Tsakiris and Haggard 
2005, see also Graziano, Cooke and Taylor 2000; Pavani, Spence and Driver 2000; but cf. Armel 
and Ramachandran 2003), or when the rubber hand is of a different laterality with respect to 
one’s own stimulated hand (i.e. coding of anatomical representations of body-parts, see Tsakiris 
and Haggard 2005).  
Two elegant studies (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Lloyd, 2007) have used parametric 
designs to investigate in greater detail the role of postural and spatial relations between the 
rubber hand and the participant’s own hand in inducing the RHI. Lloyd (2007) systematically 
varied the distance between the rubber hand and the participant’s own hand to quantify the 
spatial boundaries over which referred tactile sensations can be felt on a rubber hand. 
Introspective evidence showed that the strongest ratings of the illusion were collected when the 
distance between the two hands was closest (17.5 cm), while ratings of the RHI decayed 
significantly when the distance exceeded 30cm. Lloyd (2007) suggests that these findings can be 
accounted by the receptive fields of bimodal visuo-tactile cells that encode peripersonal space 
around the subject’s own hand. When the rubber hand is in close proximity to the participant’s 
own hand (<27.5cm), the visual representation of the rubber hand falls within the visual 
receptive field that surrounds the tactile receptive field of the participant’s own hand. This spatial 
proximity would be another necessary condition for body-ownership. 
Costantini and Haggard (2007) investigated the effects of directional mismatch between 
the stimulation of the two hands, and equivalent mismatches between the postures of the two 
hands, either by adjusting stimulation or posture of the participant’s hand, or, by adjusting 
stimulation or posture of the rubber hand. The RHI survived small changes in the participant’s 
hand posture, but disappeared when the same posture transformations were applied to the rubber 
hand, while a mismatch between the direction of stimulation delivered to the participant’s hand 
and the rubber hand completely abolished the RHI as measured by proprioceptive drift. 
Interestingly, when the participant’s hand posture was slightly different from the rubber hand 
posture, the RHI remained as long as stimulation of the two hands was congruent in a hand-
centred spatial reference frame, even though the altered posture of the participant’s hand meant 
that stimulation was incongruent in external space. Conversely, the RHI was reduced when the 
stimulation was incongruent in hand-centred space, but congruent in external space, suggesting 
that “a small transformation of what the subject sees reduces the illusion more than the 
equivalent transformation of what they feel” (Costantini & Haggard, 2007, p.238). According to 
Costantini & Haggard (2007), first a transformation aligns the rubber hand with the subject’s 
own hand, and then the correlation between visual and tactile stimulation is computed.  
Towards a model of body-ownership 11
Converging evidence from RHI studies (Costanini & Haggard, 2007; Lloyd, 2007; 
Ehrsson et al., 2004; Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), studies on visuo-tactile 
extinction on neuropsychological patients (di Pellegrino, Ladavas, & Farne, 1997; Farne, 
Dematte, & Ladavas, 2005; Ladavas, di Pellegrino, Farne, & Zeloni, 1998) and 
neurophysiological studies on monkeys (Graziano et al., 2000) suggests that correlated 
multisensory stimulation and spatial proximity are necessary but not sufficient for the integration 
of a visual stimulus to peripersonal space or for the experience of ownership during the RHI. 
Anatomical and postural correspondence between the visually stimulated body part and the 
tactually stimulated body-part are also necessary for body-ownership. These consistent findings 
suggest that factors other than the mere correlation between synchronized visual and tactile 
events modulate the experience of body-ownership. 
 
5. Body-ownership as an interaction between current multisensory input and 
internal models of the body: a neurocognitive model of body-ownership 
Makin, Holmes & Erhsson (2008) put forward a parsimonious account of the RHI based 
on processes of multi-sensory integration in peri-hand space (Maravita, Spence & Driver, 2003), 
without the need of top-down modulation by body-representations. On their account, the RHI 
occurs when the following two conditions are met: first, the rubber hand should be situated in an 
anatomically plausible position, and second, the synchronous visual and tactile events should be 
both located near to the visible hand. Even though all the aforementioned modulations of the 
RHI take place within peripersonal space and exploit mechanisms of multi-sensory hand-centred 
representations of space (Lloyd, 2007; Makin, Holmes & Erhsson, 2008), it seems unlikely that a 
full account of the experience of ownership during the RHI can be given solely on the basis of 
these mechanisms and their neural underpinnings. Note, that this account does not make any 
explicit predictions about the occurrence of RHI when the rubber hand is placed in an 
anatomically plausible position, but one that is incongruent to the participant’s own hand (see 
Costantini & Haggard, 2007), or when the viewed object is not a body-part (e.g. a neutral non-
corporeal object).  
Mechanisms of hand-centred multisensory integration operate during body-extension 
after use of non-corporeal objects (e.g. tool-use, see Maravita & Iriki, 2004) as well as during 
incorporation (Ehrsson et al. 2004), suggesting that they perform a basic computational process 
that is not unique to body-ownership. In fact, the mechanisms of peri-hand multisensory 
integration implicated by Makin et al (2008) in the experience of body-ownership are present 
even if there is a postural incongruency between the participant’s own hand and the rubber hand: 
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for example the preference for a stimulus approaching the rubber hand is similar in the posterior 
part of the intraparietal sulcus to that shown for the real hand (Makin et al, 2007), suggesting that 
viewing visual stimuli near a rubber hand is sufficient to change the representation of hand 
position in peri-hand brain areas. However, even small incongruencies at the postural level 
abolish the RHI (Costantini & Haggard, 2007).  
In addition, lesions in brain areas that underpin these processes such as the ventral 
premotor cortex and intraparietal sulcus (Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson, 2008) do not result in 
denial of body-ownership (Baier & Karnath, 2007). Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson (2008) cite two 
studies by Arzy et al (2006) and Berti et al (2007) to support the hypothesis that lesions in 
premotor cortex result in deficits in body-ownership. Arzy et al (2006) report a case study of a 
patient who, following two small confined lesions in the right premotor and motor cortices, “felt 
that parts of her left arm had disappeared. Much to her surprise she could see the table on which 
she had rested her left arm as if she could see the table through the arm, and saw her left arm 
only above her elbow, with a clear-cut border” (p 1022). The patient described by Arzy et al 
(2006) displayed asomatognosia (i.e. loss of awareness of one body-half (which may or may be 
not paralysed, see Critchey, 1953), but not somatoparaphrenia, that is, the patient did not report 
any experience of disownership (at least not as the case is reported). Similarly, the study by Berti 
and colleagues (2007) focused on patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia, a syndrome that is 
dissociable from somatoparaphrenia (Vallar & Rocheti, 2008). Finally, there are behavioural 
changes that occur after participants experience the RHI (see Moseley et al., 2008 and section 2 
above) that cannot be solely accounted by multi-sensory integration in peri-hand space, without 
considering other higher-order representations of the body.  
The aforementioned processes postulated by Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson (2008) are 
indeed necessary for the experience of body-ownership. However, the studies reviewed in 
section 4 converge on the hypothesis that multisensory integration in peripersonal hand space by 
itself is not sufficient for body-ownership. Instead, other factors such as the visual form 
congruency between the viewed object and the felt body-part (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Haans 
et al., 2008; see also Holmes,  Snijders, & Spence, 2006),  the anatomical congruency between 
viewed and felt body-part (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Graziano et al., 2000; Pavani et al, 2000), 
the volumetric congruency between the viewed and the felt body-part (Pavani & Zampini, 2007), 
the postural congruency between the viewed and felt body-part (Austen et al., 2004; Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Pavani et al., 2000), and the 
spatial relation between viewed and felt body-part (Lloyd, 2007),  modulate the induction of the 
RHI and the experience of body-ownership. Figure 1 proposes a preliminary neurocognitive 
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model of body-ownership that can account for the majority of the empirical findings to date and 
generate testable hypothesis for future research. 
In the first critical comparison, the visual form of the viewed object is compared against a 
pre-existing body model that contains a reference description of the visual, anatomical and 
structural properties of the body (Tsakiris, Haggard & Costantini, 2008; Costantini and Haggard 
2007; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005), that are diachronic, in contrast to the body schema which is 
continuously updated as the body moves (Wolpert et al. 1998). Other authors have suggested the 
existence of a stored and not stimulus-evoked body-structural description that would contain 
representations about (a) the shape and contours of the human body, (b) a detailed plan of the 
body surface, (c) the location of body-parts, the boundaries between them, and their internal part-
relation (de Vignemont, Tsakiris & Haggard, 2004; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005). Schwoebel and 
Coslett (2005) suggested that this body-structural description is view-independent or even 
allocentric, but what seems to be important for the sense of body-ownership induced during the 
RHI is that the body-model operates off-line and more interestingly it seems to be normative (de 
Preester & Tsakiris, 2009) or egopetal (Longo et al., 2009) for one’s own body, because its 
modulatory influence allows for an external body-part to be considered as a potential part of my 
body or not. This first critical comparison will test the fitness for incorporeability of the viewed 
object. Objects that do not pass this test will not be experienced as part of one’s body even if 
visuo-tactile stimulation is synchronous (Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris, Costantini & Haggard, 
2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; but see Armel & Ramachadran, 2003). The model predicts that 
the more the viewed object matches the structural appearance of the body-part’s form, the 
stronger the experience of body-ownership will be. Features such as skin colour do not seem to 
enter into this comparison (see Longo et al., 2009) and this is a further argument why this body-
model should not be equated with a conscious body-image.  
The second critical comparison takes place between the current state of the body and the 
postural and anatomical features of the body-part that is to be attributed. Body schematic 
processes (e.g. current postural configuration), as well as current reafferent information (as 
shown in the connection between touch and vision and body state in Figure 1) will be informing 
this current state of the body. If there is incongruency between the posture of felt and seen hands, 
the seen hand will not be experienced as part of one’s own body, even if the multisensory 
stimulation between the two hands suggests otherwise (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Ehrsson et 
al., 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The model predicts that discrepancies at the postural and 
anatomical level will reduce the experience of ownership. The third comparison is between 
current sensory input, that is, between the vision of touch and the felt touch and their reference 
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frames. For large discrepancies in tactile and visual reference frames (Lloyd, 2007), the RHI will 
not occur. Similarly, temporal asynchrony between vision of touch and felt touch will not induce 
the subjective referral of touch to the rubber hand and the eventual feeling of body-ownership 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) that updates the body-model. The model 
predicts that discrepancies in the directional or temporal parameters of visuo-tactile stimulation 
will impede the recalibration of their reference frames and the subsequent touch referral, 
preventing, thus, the induction of the experience of ownership. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 On the basis of the empirical findings reviewed above, body-ownership during the model 
instance of embodiment as studied in the RHI arises as an interaction between multisensory input 
and modulations exerted by stored and online internal models of the body (Tsakiris and Haggard, 
2005; Tsakiris, 2007). This functional interaction between multisensory integration and body 
models should have identifiable neural signatures. Section 6 reviews a series of experiments 
investigating the distinct neural mechanisms that underpin the experience of body-ownership 
during the RHI. As described in the next section, the first critical comparison involves the 
contribution of a body-model underpinned by the right temporoparietal junction. The processes 
engaged in the second and third comparisons engage the anterior (i.e. SII, see Press et al., 2007; 
Tsakiris et al., 2007) and posterior parietal cortices (Ehrsson et al, 2004; Kammers et al., 2008; 
Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson, 2008), with the premotor cortex underlying additional multisensory 
processes that produce the touch referral (Ehrsson et al., 2004). Finally, the subjective experience 
of body-ownership is underpinned by activity in the right posterior insula (Baier & Karnath, 
2008; Tsakiris et al., 2007).  
 
6. A neural network for body-ownership 
6.1. Testing for fit with the body-model: the contribution of rTPJ 
How does the brain decide on the compatibility and eventual incorporeability of an 
external object? The behavioural (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) and electrophysiological (Press et 
al., 2007) data suggest that the process of filtering what may or may not become part of one’s 
body is not the same as the process of multisensory integration that drives the RHI. Tsakiris, 
Costantini & Haggard (2008) suggested that current sensory stimuli are processed and finally 
tested-for-fit against an abstract body-model that maintains a coherent sense of one’s body as 
distinct from other non-corporeal objects (see Figure 1, comparison 1).  
Press et al (2007) investigated whether the modulation of somatosesnsory processing by 
visuotactile processing is driven by bottom-up processes (i.e. temporal synchronicity of 
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multisensory input) or by top-down processes (i.e. coherence with pre-existing body 
representations). During training, participants viewed a rubber hand or a neutral object 
stimulated in synchrony or not, with stimulation of their own hand. During the test phase, 
somatosensory ERPs were recorded to tactile stimulation of the left or right hand, to assess how 
tactile processing was affected by previous visuotactile training. An enhanced somatosensory 
N140 component was elicited after synchronous, compared with uncorrelated, visuotactile 
training, independently of the previously viewed object (rubber hand or neutral object), 
suggesting that this early effect is modulated by temporal contiguity, but not by pre-existing 
body representations (see also Keysers et al., 2004). Interestingly ERP modulations observed 
beyond 200ms post-stimulus showed a different pattern. During the 200-450ms post-stimulus 
interval, an enhanced sustained negativity was generally found for trials where a tactile stimulus 
was presented to the hand that was anatomically compatible with the visible rubber hand/object, 
relative to trials where the incompatible hand was stimulated instead, after synchronous training 
o, but not after training with uncorrelated multisensory stimulation. On the contrary, when 
participants saw a neutral object, enhanced sustained negativity was present following blocks of 
both synchronized and uncorrelated visuotactile training.This pattern reflects attentional 
modulation by  specific mental representation of the body (Press et al, 2008), suggesting that the 
compatibility between the visual form of the stimulus and an anatomical representation of the 
body specifically modulates attentional processing of tactile stimuli at post-perceptual processing 
levels, over and above the synchronicity of multisensory input.   
Based on neuropsychological symptoms following lesions in the right temporal and 
parietal lobes ((Bottini et al. 2002; Mort et al. 2003; Berlucchi and Aglioti 1997; Frassinetti et al, 
2008;Fotopoulou et al., 2008),  Tsakiris et al. (2008) hypothesized that disrupting activity in the 
right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) would impair the process the tests for the compatibility 
between the visual form of the stimulus and a mental representation of the body. on the basis of 
visuo-tactile evidence. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was delivered 
350ms after synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation of the participant’s own hand and a rubber 
hand, or the participant’s own hand and a neutral object. rTPJ was determined on the basis of 
anatomical landmarks, defined as the junction of the supramarginal, angular, and superior 
temporal gyri. Proprioceptive drift was used as a behavioural proxy of the RHI. Overall, TMS 
over rTPJ reduced the extent to which the rubber hand was incorporated into the mental 
representation of one’s own body, while it increased the incorporation of a neutral object, as 
measured by the proprioceptive drift towards or away from the viewed object. An object (i.e. a 
rubber hand) that would normally have been perceived as part of the subject’s own body was no 
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longer significantly distinguished from a clearly neutral object, suggesting that the disruption of 
neural activity over rTPJ blocked the contribution of the body-model in the assimilation of 
current sensory input, making the discrimination between what may or may not be part of one’s 
body ambiguous. This effect of TMS over rTPJ seems to have impaired a body/non-body 
discrimination process. This specific test-for-fit process can be used to filter visual and tactile 
events that may be assigned to one’s own body from sensory events that produce a mismatch. 
This view also resonates with a recent hypothesis about the computational process implemented 
in the rTPJ. Based on a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies reporting activations of rTPJ in 
various tasks (e.g. self-recogniton, agency, theory of mind, attention reorientation, perspective-
taking), Decety & Lamm (2007) suggested that the rTPJ may underpin a single computational 
mechanism that is used by multiple cognitive processes; this mechanism involves the comparison 
of internal states (e.g. prediction and representations of the body or the self in more general) with 
external sensory events. This basic computational mechanism would be important self-world 
interactions (e.g. detection of multisensory mismatch, agency), but also for higher cognitive 
functions involved in self-other interactions .  
 
6.2. Body-related multisensory integration: the contribution of parietal and premotor 
cortices  
Once the external object passes the test-for-fit, then synchronized visuo-tactile 
stimulation can drive the inducement of the RHI as a necessary condition. If there is a 
congruency between the posture and spatial location of the two hands, processes of multi-sensory 
integration in peri-hand space will allow for the recalibration of the visual and tactile coordinate 
systems, leading to the eventual referral of the tactile sensation to the vision of touch delivered 
on the rubber hand. Ehrsson and colleagues (2004, 2005, 2007) showed bilateral neural activity 
in the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in the conditions that 
induced the RHI. Consistent findings in three fMRI studies suggest different roles for posterior 
parietal cortex and PMv during the RHI. According to Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson (2008), the 
PPC seems to integrate multisensory information with respect to the rubber hand. This 
integration starts before the onset of the RHI (<11.3, ± 7.0 sec, from Ehrsson et al, 2004), 
suggesting that PPC is involved in the resolution of the conflict between the incoming visual and 
tactile information, and the resulting recalibration of the visual and tactile coordinate systems 
(see Figure 1, comparison 3).  
Another area of interest in the parietal cortex is the inferior parietal lobule (IPL). IPL has 
been shown to play a critical role in representing spatial relations of body-parts (Buxbaum & 
Towards a model of body-ownership 17
Coslett, 2001). More recently, Dijkerman & de Haan (2007) suggested that the IPL may process 
information related to perceptual judgments about body configuration. Kammers et al (2008) 
used off-line low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to investigate 
the role of the inferior posterior parietal lobule (IPL) in the inducement of the RHI. The left IPL 
was targeted over the P3 electrode site, according to the International 10–20 EEG System.  
Results showed that rTMS over the IPL attenuated the strength of the RHI as measured by 
proprioceptive drift, while subjective self-reports of feeling of ownership over the rubber hand 
remained unaffected by rTMS. This finding suggests that perhaps the recalibration of the visual 
and tactile coordinate systems is not sufficient for the experience of ownership. As Kammers et 
al (2008) note, the RHI may influence the experience and localization of one's own hand in an 
independent manner (see also Longo et al., 2009 for the partly independent components of 
ownership and localization of hand assessed with introspective evidence). In addition, 
proprioceptive mislocalizations can be observed in the absence of experienced ownership 
(Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006). However, under conditions that elicit the sense of body-
ownership during the RHI, the felt location of one’s hand towards or away from the viewed 
object in the classic RHI manipulations has been shown to correlate with the sense of body-
ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008), 
suggesting that proprioceptive drifts can be used as a behavioural proxy of the ownership: 
proprioceptive drifts towards the viewed object during the RHI indicate incorporation and 
experienced ownership, while proprioceptive drifts away from the viewed object indicate failure 
of incorporation and disownership. 
Regarding the contribution of premotor cortex, as Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson (2008) note, 
the PMv shows additional multisensory responses during the period when people experience the 
illusion (between 11.3 and 42 sec). This supra-additive activation could be explained by the 
enhancement of the responses of bimodal neurons once their reference frame is centred on the 
rubber hand, and participants start referring the touch to the rubber hand as a result of binding the 
visual and tactile events in hand-centred coordinates in the PPC. Thus, when the illusion starts, 
the hand-centred reference frames shift from the participant’s hidden hand to the rubber hand. 
This shift is accompanied by a recalibration of the participant’s hand position (i.e. proprioceptive 
drift), and it results in the referral of the tactile sensation to the rubber hand.  Note, however, that 
visuo-tactile correlation generates particularly strong proprioceptive drifts towards the rubber 
hand during the first 60sec, implying that the hand-centred reference frames continue to shift 
towards the rubber hand, and that the referred sensations are enhanced during that period. After 1 
minute of stimulation, the recalibration of hand position increases in a less exponential manner 
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for up to 3 min (see experiment 4 in Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). It therefore remains unknown 
whether activity in the PMv between 11.3 and 42 sec in Ehrsson et al (2004) reflects this rapid 
recalibration of hand position or the referral of tactile sensation on the rubber hand which could 
arise as an effect, rather than as cause, of the recalibration.  
 
6.3. The subjective experience of body-ownership: the role of the right insular lobe 
Tsakiris et al (2007) used Positron Emission Tomography (PET) to detect sustained neural 
activity that was specifically related to the stable state of ownership of the rubber hand, and not 
to the onset of the RHI per se (i.e. the period of recalibration of the visual and tactile coordinate 
systems and touch referral). A negative correlation between the proprioceptive measure of the 
illusion and rCBF was observed in the contralateral (right) primary and secondary somatosensory 
cortices. A small or negative proprioceptive drift in the RHI studies indicates that the rubber 
hand has not been attributed to one’s own body (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008). 
In these situations, the representation of the current state of the body is not captured by visual 
input because of the discrepancy. A possible role of somatosensory cortex activation relates to 
the salience of the representation of the subject’s own hand when the pattern of multisensory 
stimulation does not support the incorporation of the rubber hand: for example, when the visuo-
tactile stimulation is asynchronous or when the rubber hand is anatomically incongruent with 
respect to the participant’s hand. The maintenance of the current state of the body in the 
somatosensory cortex would prevent the induction of the RHI by making the participant’s hand 
representation salient so that it becomes resistant to multisensory stimulation. Somatosensory 
cortex activations are sensitive to handedness (i.e., left- vs. right-hand manipulation) and related 
anatomic constrains (see also Costantini et al. 2005), to the kinaesthetic proprioceptive space 
(i.e., proprioceptive drift), and to both visual and tactile inputs (see also Schaefer et al. 2005; 
Schaefer, Flor, et al. 2006; Schaefer, Noennig, et al. 2006). Thus, the somatosensory cortex may 
be involved in the processing of the current body state that includes anatomical and postural 
representations (see Figure 1, comparison 2).  
The experience of ownership of the rubber hand as measured by proprioceptive drifts was 
positively correlated with activity in the right posterior insula. Right insular activity is 
consistently implicated in self-attribution (Farrer & Frith, 2002), self-processing (Fink et al., 
1996; Vogeley et al., 2004), and the representation of an egocentric reference frame. The roles of 
the insular lobe for body-awareness in general (Craig, 2002, 2009), and of the right posterior 
insula in particular for egocentric representation (Fink et al., 2003), agency (Farrer et al., 2003), 
self-recognition (Devue et al, 2007) and body-ownership (Baier & Karnath, 2008) are well 
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supported by recent studies. The hypothesis that the right posterior insula is linked to the 
experience of body-ownership is also supported by available evidence on somatoparaphrenia.  A 
first lesion mapping study suggested that the right posterior insula is commonly damaged in 
patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP), but is significantly less involved in hemiplegic 
patients without AHP (Karnath, Baier & Naagele, 2005; see also Cereda et al., 2002; Berti et al., 
2005). A more recent lesion mapping study that focused specifically on patients with 
somatoparaphrenic symptoms (Baier & Karnath, 2008) revealed that the right posterior insula is 
indeed the critical structure involved in phenomena of “disturbed sensation of limb ownership”. 
Two further insights from the literature on somatoparaphrenia are particularly relevant for the 
understanding of induced body-ownership in the RHI. As the review by Vallar & Ronchi (2008) 
suggests, patients with spared proprioception do not exhibit somatoparaphrenia. The hypothesis 
that proprioceptive impairment is of central role in breakdowns of ownership is particularly 
interesting in relation to the behavioural measure used to quantify ownership in the RHI.2 
Second, Vallar and Ronchi (2008) point to the fact that on the basis of the available case studies 
to date, one main feature of somatoparaphrenia may be a blurred distinction between corporeal 
and extracorporeal objects. This observation points to the critical role of the body-model in 
maintaining a coherent sense of one’s body.  
 
6.4. A neural network for body-ownership 
Overall, The brain processes that produce the sense of body-ownership depend both on 
current sensory integration and also on the contribution of internal models of the body. The right 
temporo-parietal junction may underpin the assimilation of novel multisensory signals by 
maintaining a pre-existing reference representation of one’s own body. The rTPJ may underpin 
decisions about the incorporeability of the visual form of the viewed object with a reference 
body-model (see Tsakiris, Costantini & Haggard; 2008, and comparison 1 in Figure 1)). The 
primary and associative somatosensory cortices seem to maintain on-line anatomical and 
postural representations of the current state of the body against which the anatomical and 
postural features of the stimulated object are compared (see comparison 2, Figure 1). Body-
related sensory integration linked to the onset of body-ownership during the RHI is related to 
activity in the posterior parietal cortex and the ventral premotor cortex (see comparison 3, 
Figure1, and Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2007; Kammers et al., 2008). The effect of multisensory 
integration and recalibration of hand position, namely the experience of body-ownership of the 
                                                 
2 Obviously, loss of proprioception by itself is by no means sufficient for breakdowns in body-
ownership as the literature on de-afferented patients suggests.  
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rubber hand, is correlated with activity in the right posterior insula (Tsakiris et al., 2007; see also 
Baier & Karnath, 2008). Other authors have also suggested that the insula is concerned with 
higher-order somatosensory processing of the body that is related to a subjective awareness and 
affective processing of bodily signals (Craig 2002, 2009; Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007). The 
available imaging evidence on the RHI are consistent with the view that SII and the insula are 
responsible for conscious somatosensory perception, with the right posterior parietal cortex 
contributing to spatio-temporal integration (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007). Circuitry and 
connectivity analyses demonstrate both the afferent and efferent connectivity of the insula with 
SII, the temporoparietal area and the premotor cortex (Augustine, 1996; see also Djikerman & de 
Haan, 1997). These structures may form a network that plays a fundamental role in linking 
current sensory stimuli to one’s own body, and thus also in self-awareness. The available 
neuroimaging and neuropsychological data favour a right-hemispheric specificity for self-
processing in general (see Keenan et al., 2005) and for body-ownership specifically (Baier & 
Karnath, 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Vallar & Ronchi, 2008).  
 
7. Beyond my hand: my body and myself 
This paper focused on the necessary conditions for the experience of a body-part as 
belonging to my body as studied with the RHI. Blanke & Metzinger (2009) rightly comment on 
the need to investigate a more “global” sense of body-ownership for the whole body. Three 
recent studies employed visuo-tactile synchrony to investigate the extent to which phenomena 
similar to the RHI can be induced for whole bodies. Ehrsson (2007) used synchronous or 
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation while participants were looking at their back with the 
perspective of a person sitting behind them with stereoscopic vision. Synchronous but not 
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation induced a shift in the 1st person perspective such that 
participants experienced being located at some distance behind the visual image of their own 
body as if they were looking at someone else. In the study by Leggenhanger et al (2007), 
participants viewed the backs of their bodies filmed from a distance of 2 m and projected onto a 
three-dimensional (3D)–video head-mounted display. The participants’ backs were stroked either 
synchronously or asynchronously with respect to the virtually seen body. Questionnaire ratings 
and a behavioural measure analogous to proprioceptive drift in the RHI showed that only after 
synchronous stimulation, participants felt as the virtual body was their body. Similar results were 
obtained when participants saw a virtual fake body (e.g. a mannequin), but not when participants 
saw a virtual non-corporeal object, replicating other studies reporting an abolishment of the 
illusion of ownership for non-corporeal objects (see Haans et al, 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
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2005). Interestingly, the necessary conditions for the experience of ownership over a body-part 
seem to be the same as the ones involved in the experience of ownership for full bodies. The 
question of whether ownership for body-parts has different functional correlates from ownership 
for the whole body has not been directly addressed in the empirical literature. However, the 
available empirical findings from the two domains suggest that very similar neurocognitive 
processes are involved in ownership of body-parts and bodies.  
Two further manipulations of the whole-body studies resulted in the illusion of body-
swapping (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008) and changes in self-face recognition (Tsakiris, 2008). 
Petkova & Ehrsson (2008) fitted two small cameras on the head of a mannequin directed 
downwards. The image from the two cameras was projected to a head-mounted display worn by 
the participant. When the participant looked downwards, she saw the mannequin’s body, where 
she would normally expect to see her own. Synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation induced the 
illusion of being this other body (i.e. the mannequin’s body), suggesting that multisensory 
stimulation can induce not only an analogue of out-of-body experiences (Ehrsson, 2007; 
Leggenhager et al., 2007), but also an illusion of being into another body and a dramatic change 
in embodied perspective. These manipulations demonstrate the efficiency of current 
multisensory input in determining the experience of a minimal 1st person-perspective (Ehrsson, 
2007), self-location (Leggenhager et al, 2007) and self-identification (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008), 
three conditions that are critical for the experience of selfhood (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). To 
further investigate the extent to which current multisensory input may influence the sense of self- 
identity, Tsakiris (2008) extended the paradigm of multisensory integration to self-face 
recognition. Participants were stroked on their face while they were looking at a morphed face 
being touched in synchrony or asynchrony. Before and after the visuo-tactile stimulation 
participants performed a self-recognition task. The results showed that synchronized 
multisensory signals had a significant effect on self-face recognition. Synchronous tactile 
stimulation while watching another person’s face being similarly touched produced a bias in 
recognizing one’s own face, in the direction of the other person included in the representation of 
one’s own face. This effect provides direct evidence that our mental representation of our self, 
such as self-face representation, is not solely derived from stable representations, but instead 
these representations are susceptible to current multisensory evidence. Multisensory integration 
can update cognitive representations of one’s body, such as the sense of ownership of body-parts 
(Longo et al., 2008) or whole body (Ehrsson, 2007; Leggenhanger et al., 2007; Petkova & 
Ehrsson, 2008), the physical appearance of one’s body (Longo et al., 2009), and the 
representation of one’s identity in relation to other people (Tsakiris, 2008).  
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8. Conclusion 
One of the key questions in the neurocognitive study of self is that of specificity (Gillihan 
& Farah, 2005; Legrand & Ruby, 2009). Gillihan & Farah (2004) point to the fact that there is 
not a self-specific neural system or a single sense of self. Legrand & Ruby (2009) suggest that 
“self-specificity characterizes the subjective perspective, which is not intrinsically self-evaluative 
but rather relates any represented object to the representing subject”, by means of multisensory 
processing and sensorimotor integration. The present review focused on multisensory processing 
and its role for body-ownership only (for the role of sensorimotor integration for body-
ownership, see Tsakiris, Schutz-Bosbach & Gallagher, 2008). In particular, it considered how 
multisensory integration together with internal models of the body modulate the experience of 
the body as being one’s own, as well as the demarcation or distinction between one’s body and 
other objects. The experience of body-ownership may represent a critical component of self-
specificity as evidenced by the different ways in which multisensory integration in interaction 
with internal models of the body can actually manipulate important physical and psychological 
aspects of the self. Future studies should further investigate the neurocognitive processes that 
bridge physical and psychological dimensions of self to advance our understanding of the sense 
of identity.   
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership during the Rubber Hand Illusion. 
In the first critical comparison, the visual form of the viewed object is compared against a pre-
existing body model that contains a reference description of the visual, anatomical and structural 
properties of the body. The rTPJ has been shown to be involved in this comparison (Tsakiris, 
Haggard & Costantini, 2008). The second critical comparison takes place between the current 
state of the body and the postural and anatomical features of the body-part that is to be 
experienced as mine. This comparison is underpinned by activity in anterior parietal areas such 
as the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices (see Press et al., 2007; Tsakiris et al., 
2007). The third comparison is between the current sensory input, that is, between the vision of 
touch and the felt touch and their respective reference frames. The PPC underpins this third 
comparison by resolving the conflict between visual and tactile information and recalibrating the 
visual and tactile coordinate systems (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson, 2008). 
This recalibration will result in the touch referral, underpinned by activity in the premotor cortex 
(Ehrsson et al., 2004). Finally, the subjective experience of ownership, underpinned by activity 
in the right posterior insula (Tsakiris et al, 2007), will update the body model, resulting in the 
incorporation of hand and subsequent physiological regulation of the body (Moseley et al., 
2008). The crossed circle represents a comparator. The recycling arrow denotes a loop. 
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